In this paper, we consider coding schemes for computationally bounded channels, which can introduce an arbitrary set of errors as long as (a) the fraction of errors is bounded with high probability by a parameter p and (b) the process which adds the errors can be described by a sufficiently "simple" circuit. Codes for such channel models are attractive since, like codes for standard adversarial errors, they can handle channels whose true behavior is unknown or varying over time.
Introduction
For the binary symmetric channel which flips each transmitted bit independently with probability p < 1/2, the optimal rate of reliable transmission is known to be the Shannon capacity 1 − H(p), where H(·) is the binary entropy function [34] . Moreover, concatenated codes (Forney [12] ) and polar codes (Arikan [3] ) can transmit at rates arbitrarily close to this capacity and are efficiently decodable. In contrast, for adversarial channels that can corrupt up to a fraction p of symbols in an arbitrary manner, the optimal rate is unknown in general, though it is known for all p ∈ (0, 1 2 ) that the rate has to be much smaller than the Shannon capacity. In particular, for p ∈ [ 1 4 , 1 2 ), the achievable rate over an adversarial channel is asymptotically zero, while the Shannon capacity 1 − H(p) remains positive. Determining the best asymptotic rate for error fraction p (equivalently, minimum relative distance 2p) remains an important open question in combinatorial coding theory.
Codes that tolerate adversarial errors are attractive because they can transmit reliably over a large range of channels whose true behavior is unknown or varies over time. In contrast, codes tailored to a specific channel model tend to fail when the model changes. For example, concatenated codes, which can transmit efficiently and reliably at the Shannon capacity with i.i.d. errors, fail miserably in the presence of burst errors that occur in long runs.
In this paper, we consider several intermediate models of uncertain channels. Specifically, we consider computationally bounded channels, which can introduce an arbitrary set of errors as long as (a) the total fraction of errors is bounded by p with high probability and (b) the process which adds the errors can be described by a sufficiently "simple" circuit. The idea behind these models is that natural processes may be mercurial, but are not computationally intensive. These models are powerful enough to capture natural settings like i.i.d. and burst errors, but weak enough to allow efficient communication arbitrarily close to the Shannon capacity 1 − H(p). The models we study, or close variants, have been considered previously-see Section 2 for a discussion of related work. The computational perspective we espouse is inspired by the works of Lipton [27] and Micali et al. [28] .
For three classes of channels, we provide efficiently encodable and decodable codes of optimal rate (arbitrarily close to 1 − H(p)) where only inefficiently decodable codes were previously known. In each case, we provide one encoder/decoder that works for every channel in the class. In particular, our results apply even when the channel's behavior depends on the code.
Structure of this paper. We first describe the models and our results briefly (Section 1.1), and outline our main technical contributions (Section 1.2). In Section 2, we describe related lines of work aimed at handling (partly) adversarial errors with rates near Shannon capacity. Our results are stated formally in Section 3. Section 4 describes our list-decoding-based constructions of channels for additive errors. Section 5 describes our efficient constructions at a high-level. The remainder of the paper describes and analyzes the constructions in detail, in order of increasing channel strength: additive errors (Section 6), space-bounded errors (Section 7) and time-bounded errors (Section 8). The appendices contain extra details on the building blocks in our constructions (A), results for the "average" error criterion (B) and our impossibility result (C), respectively.
Our results
The encoders we construct are stochastic (that is, randomized). Probabilities are taken over the (local, unknown to the decoder) coins of the encoder and the choices of the channel; messages may be chosen adversarially and known to the channel. Our results do not assume any setup or shared randomness between the encoder and decoder.
Unique decoding for additive channels. We give the first explicit construction of stochastic codes with polynomial-time encoding/decoding algorithms that approach the Shannon capacity 1 − H(p) for additive (a.k.a. oblivious) channels. These are channels which add an arbitrary error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N of Hamming weight at most pN to the transmitted codeword (of length N ). The error vector may depend on the code and the message but, crucially, not on the encoder's local random coins. Additive errors capture binary symmetric errors as well as certain models of correlated errors, like burst errors. For a deterministic encoder, the additive error model is equivalent to the usual adversarial error model. A randomized encoder is thus necessary to achieve the Shannon capacity.
We also provide a novel, simple proof that (inefficient) capacity-achieving codes exist for additive channels. We do so by combining linear list-decodable codes with rate approaching 1−H(p) (known to exist, but not known to be efficiently decodable) with a special type of authentication scheme. Previous existential proofs relied on complex random coding arguments [6, 24] ; see the discussion of related work below.
List decoding for space-bounded channels. The additive errors model postulates that the error vector has to be picked obliviously, before seeing the codeword. To model more complex processes, we consider a channel that processes the codeword as a stream, deciding as it goes which positions to corrupt. The channel's only limitation is a bound S(N ) on the amount of work space it can use (as a function of the block length N ). Roughly, we view the channel as a finite automaton with 2 S(N ) states. More precisely, in order to allow nonuniform dependency on the code, we model the channel as a width-2 S(N ) branching program that outputs one bit for every input bit that it reads. Even for constant space S, this model captures a wide range of channels considered in coding theory, including additive channels, discrete channels with finite memory, bounded delay and arbitrarily varying channels; see the discussion of related work below for definitions. Our constructions tolerate the larger class of logarithmic-space channels. As above, we assume that the channel introduces at most pN errors with high probability.
First, we show that reliable unique decoding with positive rate is impossible even if one only wants to tolerate an arbitrary memoryless channel, when p > 1/4. The idea is that even a memoryless adversary can make the transmitted codeword difficult to distinguish from a different, random codeword. The proof relies on the requirement that a single code must work for all channels, since the "hard" channel depends on the code.
Thus, to communicate at a rate close to 1 − H(p) for all p, we consider the relaxation to list-decoding: the decoder is allowed to output a small list of messages, one of which is correct. List-decodable codes with rate approaching 1 − H(p) are known to exist even for adversarial errors [41, 11] . However, constructing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time encodable and decodable) codes for list decoding with near-optimal rate is a major open problem.
Our main contribution for space-bounded channels is a construction of polynomial-time listdecodable codes that approach the optimal rate for channels whose space bound is logarithmic in the block length N . Specifically, for every message m and log-space channel W, the decoder takes W(Enc(m; r)) as input and returns a small list of messages that, with high probability over r and the coins of the channel, contains the real message m. The size of the list is polynomial in 1/ε, where N (1 − H(p) − ε) is the length of the transmitted messages. Note that the decoder need not return all words within a distance pN of the received word (as is the case for the standard "combinatorial" notion of list decoding), but it must return the correct message as one of the candidates with high probability. This notion of list-decoding is natural for stochastic codes in communication applications. In fact, it is exactly the notion that is needed in constructions which "sieve" the list, such as [14, 28] ; see related work in Section 2.
Our results raise a compelling question: are there stochastic codes of rate approaching 1 − H(p) that can be uniquely decoded from pn log-space errors, when p < 1/4?
List decoding for polynomial time channels. More generally, one may consider channels whose behavior on N -bit inputs is described by a circuit of size T (N ). Logarithmic space channels, in particular, can be realized by polynomial-size circuits. In fact, we do not know of any channel models considered in the information theory literature, other than purely adversarial channels, which require more than linear time to implement. Our construction of list-decodable codes for logarithmic-space channels can be extended to handle channels with a given polynomial time bound T (n) = N c , for any fixed c > 1, under an additional assumption, namely, the existence of pseudorandom generators of constant stretch that output N pseudorandom bits and fool circuits of size N c . Such generators exist, for example, if there are functions in E which have no subexponential-size circuits [30, 21] , or if one-way functions exist [40, 19] .
For all three models, our constructions require the development of new methods for applying tools from cryptography and derandomization to coding-theoretic problems. We give a brief discussion of these techniques next. A more detailed discussion of the approach behind our code construction appears in Section 5.
Techniques
Control/payload construction. In our constructions, we develop several new techniques. The first is a novel "reduction" from the standard coding setting with no setup to the setting of shared secret randomness. In models in which errors are distributed evenly, such a reduction is relatively simple [1] ; however, this reduction fails against adversarial errors. Instead, we show how to hide the secret randomness (the control information) inside the main codeword (the payload ) in such a way that the decoder can learn the control information but (a) the control information remains hidden to a bounded channel and (b) its encoding is robust to a certain, weaker class of errors. We feel this technique should be useful in other settings of bounded adversarial behavior.
Our reduction can also be viewed as a novel way of bootstrapping from "small" codes, which can be decoded by brute force, to "large" codes, which can be decoded efficiently. The standard way to do this is via concatenation; unfortunately, concatenation does not work well even against mildly unpredictable models, such as the additive error model.
Pseudorandomness. Second, our results further develop a surprising connection between coding and pseudorandomness. Hiding the "control information" from the channel requires us to make different settings of the control information indistinguishable from the channel's point of view. Thus, our proofs apply techniques from cryptography together with constructions of pseudorandom objects (generators and samplers) from derandomization. Typically, the "tests" that must be fooled are compositions of the channel (which we assume has low complexity) with some subroutine of the decoder (which we design to have low complexity). The connection to pseudorandomness appeared in a simpler form in the previous work on bounded channels [27, 13, 28] ; our use of this connection is significantly more delicate.
Background and Related Previous Work
There are several lines of work aimed at handling adversarial, or partly adversarial, errors with rates near the Shannon capacity. We survey them briefly here and highlight the relationship to our results.
List decoding. List decoding was introduced in the late 1950s [10, 39] and has witnessed a lot of recent algorithmic work (cf. the survey [15] ). Under list decoding, the decoder outputs a small list of messages that must include the correct message. Random coding arguments demonstrate that there exist binary codes of rate 1−H(p)−ε which can tolerate pN adversarial errors if the decoder is allowed to output a list of size O(1/ε) [11, 41, 16] . The explicit construction of binary list-decodable codes with rate close to 1 − H(p), however, remains a major open question. We provide such codes for the special case of corruptions introduced by space-or time-bounded channels.
Adding Setup-Shared Randomness. Another relaxation is to allow randomized coding strategies where the sender and receiver share "secret" randomness, hidden from the channel, which is used to pick a particular, deterministic code at random from a family of codes. Such randomized strategies were called private codes in [23] . Using this secret shared randomness, one can transmit at rates approaching 1 − H(p) against adversarial errors (for example, by randomly permuting the symbols and adding a random offset [27, 23] ). Using explicit codes achieving capacity on the BSC p [12] , one can even get such randomized codes of rate approaching 1 − H(p) explicitly (although getting an explicit construction with o(n) randomness remains an open problem [35] ). A related notion of setup is the public key model of Micali et al. [28] , in which the sender generates a public key that is known to the receiver and possibly to the channel. This model only makes sense for computationally bounded channels, discussed below.
Our constructions are the first (for all three models) which achieve rate 1 − H(p) with efficient decoding and no setup assumptions.
AVCs: Oblivious, nonuniform errors. A different approach to modeling uncertain channels is embodied by the rich literature on arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), surveyed in [26] . Despite being extensively investigated in the information theory literature, AVCs have not received much algorithmic attention.
An AVC is specified by a finite state space S and a family of memoryless channels {W s : s ∈ S}. The channel's behavior is governed by its state, which is allowed to vary arbitrarily. The AVC's behavior in a particular execution is specified by a vector s = (s 1 , ..., s N ) ∈ S N : the channel applies the operation W s i to the ith bit of the codeword. A code for the AVC is required to transmit reliably with high probability for every sequence s, possibly subject to some state constraint. Thus AVCs model uncertainty via the nonuniform choice of the state vector s ∈ S N . However -and this is the one of the key differences that makes the bounded space model more powerful -the choice of vector s in an AVC is oblivious to the codeword; that is, the channel cannot look at the codeword to decide the state sequence.
The additive errors channel we consider is captured by the AVC framework. Indeed, consider the simple AVC where S = {0, 1} and when in state s, the channel adds s mod 2 to the input bit. With the state constraint
pN on the state sequence (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N ) of the AVC, this models additive errors, where an arbitrary error vector e with at most p fraction of 1's is added to the codeword by the channel, but e is chosen obliviously of the codeword. Csiszár and Narayan determined the capacity of AVCs with state constraints [7, 8] . In particular, for the additive case, they showed that random codes can achieve rate approaching 1 − H(p) while correcting any specific error pattern e of weight pN with high probability. 1 Note that codes providing this guarantee cannot be linear, since the bad error vectors are the same for all codewords in a linear code. The decoding rule used in [7] to prove this claim was quite complex, and it was simplified to the more natural closest codeword rule in [8] . Langberg [24] revisited this special case (which he called an oblivious channel ) and gave another proof of the above claim, based on a different random coding argument.
As outlined above, we provide two results for this model. First, we give a new, more modular existential proof. More importantly, we provide the first explicit constructions of codes for this model which achieve the optimal rate 1 − H(p).
Polynomial-time bounded channels. In a different vein, Lipton [27] considered channels whose behavior can be described by a polynomial-time algorithm. He showed how a small amount of secret shared randomness (the seed for a pseudorandom generator) could be used to communicate at the Shannon capacity over any polynomial-time channel that introduces a bounded number of errors. Micali et al. [28] gave a similar result in a public key model; however, their result relies on efficiently list-decodable codes, which are only known with sub-optimal rate. Both results assume the existence of one-way functions and some kind of setup. On the positive side, in both cases the channel's time bound need not be known explicitly ahead of time; one gets a trade-off between the channel's time and its probability of success.
Our list decoding result removes the setup assumptions of [27, 28] at the price of imposing a specific polynomial bound on the channel's running time and relaxing to list-decoding. However, our result also implies stronger unique decoding results in the public-key model [28] . Specifically, our codes can be plugged into the construction of Micali et al. to get unique decoding at rates up to the Shannon capacity when the sender has a public key known to the decoder (and possibly to the channel). The idea, roughly, is to sign messages before encoding them; see [28] for details.
Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [31] and Hemenway and Ostrosky [20] considered the construction of locally decodable codes in the presence of computationally bounded errors assuming some setup (private [31] and public [20] keys, respectively). The techniques used for locally decodable codes are quite different from those used in more traditional coding settings; we do not know if the ideas from our constructions can be used to remove the setup assumptions from [31, 20] .
Logarithmic-space channels. Galil et al. [13] considered a slightly weaker model, logarithmic space, that still captures most physically realizable channels. They modeled the channel as a finite automaton with polynomially-many states. Using Nisan's generator for log-space machines [29] , they removed the assumption of one-way functions from Lipton's construction in the shared randomness model [27] .
We add nonuniformity to their model to get a common generalization of arbitrarily varying channels. Our code construction for logarithmic-space channels removes the assumption of shared setup in the model of [13] , at but achieves only list decoding. This relaxation is necessary for some parameter ranges, since unique decoding in this model is impossible when p > 1/4.
Online Codes. Our logarithmic-space channel can also be seen as a restriction of online, or causal, channels, recently studied by Dey, Jaggi and Langberg [9, 25] . These channels make a single-pass through the codeword, introducing errors as they go. They are not restricted in either space usage or computation time. It is known that codes for online channels cannot achieve the Shannon rate; specifically, the achievable asymptotic rate is at most max(1 − 4p, 0) [9] . Our impossibility result, which shows that the rate of codes for time-or space-bounded channels is asymptotically 0 for p > 1 4 , can be seen as a partial extension of the online channels results of [9, 25] to computationally-bounded channels, though our proof technique is quite different.
Statements of Results
Recall the notion of stochastic codes: A stochastic binary code of rate R ∈ (0, 1) and block length N is given by an encoding function Enc : {0, 1} RN × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} N which encodes the RN message bits, together with some additional random bits, into an N -bit codeword. Here, N and b are integers, and we assume for simplicity that RN is an integer.
Codes for worst-case additive errors
Existential result via list decoding. We give a novel construction of stochastic codes for additive errors by combining linear list-decodable codes with a certain kind of authentication code called algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes. Such AMD codes can detect additive corruption with high probability, and were defined and constructed for cryptographic applications in [5] . The linearity of the list-decodable code is therefore crucial to make the combination with AMD codes work. The linearity ensures that the spurious messages output by the list-decoder are all additive offsets of the true message and depend only on the error vector (and not on m, r). An additional feature of our construction is that even when the fraction of errors exceeds p, the decoder outputs a decoding failure with high probability (rather than decoding incorrectly). This feature is important when using these codes as a component in our explicit construction, mentioned next.
The formal result is stated below. Details can be found in Section 4. The notation Ω p,ε expresses an asymptotic lower bound in which p and ε are held constant.
Theorem 3.1. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there exists a family of stochastic codes of rate R 1−H(p)−ε and a deterministic (exponential time) decoder Dec : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} RN ∪{⊥} such that for every m ∈ {0, 1} RN and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N of Hamming weight at most pN , Pr r Dec Enc(m, r) + e = m 1 − 2 −Ωp,ε(N ) . Moreover, when more than a fraction p of errors occur, the decoder is able to detect this and report a decoding failure (⊥) with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ωp,ε(N ) . Given an explicit family of linear binary codes of rate R that can be efficiently list-decoded from fraction p of errors with list-size bounded by a polynomial function in N , one can construct an explicit stochastic code of rate R − o(1) with the above guarantee along with an efficient decoder.
Explicit, efficient codes achieving capacity. Explicit binary list-decodable codes of optimal rate are not known, so one cannot use the above connection to construct explicit stochastic codes of rate ≈ 1 − H(p) for pN additive errors. Nevertheless, we give an explicit construction of capacityachieving stochastic codes against worst-case additive errors. The construction is described at a high-level in Section 5 and in further detail in Section 6. Theorem 3.2. For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), every ε > 0, and infinitely many N , there is an explicit, efficient stochastic code of block length N and rate R 1 − H(p) − ε which corrects a p fraction of additive errors with probability 1 − o(1). Specifically, there are polynomial time algorithms Enc and Dec such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1} RN and every error vector e of Hamming weight at most pN , we have Pr r [Dec(Enc(m; r) + e) = m] = 1 − exp(−Ω p,ε (N/ log 2 N )).
A slight modification of our construction gives codes for the "average error criterion," in which the code is deterministic but the message is assumed to be uniformly random and unknown to the channel.
Codes for online log-space bounded channels
We generalize the model of Galil et al. [13] to capture both finite automaton-based models as well as arbitrarily varying channels. To model channels (as opposed to Boolean functions), we augment standard branching programs with the ability to output bits at each step.
Definition 1 (Space bounded channels). An online space-S channel is a read-once branching program of width 2 S that outputs one bit at each computation step. Specifically, let Q = {0, 1} S be a set of 2 S states. For input length N , the channel is given by a sequence of N transition functions
A randomized online space-S channel is a probability distribution over the space of deterministic online space-S channels. For a given input x, such a channel induces a corresponding distribution on outputs. A randomized channel A is pN -bounded with probability 1 − β if, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1} N , with probability at least 1 − β, the channel flips fewer than pN bits of x, that is,
We exhibit a very simple "zero space" channel that rules out achieving any positive rate (i.e., the capacity is zero) when p > 1/4. In each position, the channel either leaves the transmitted bit alone, sets it to 0, or sets it to 1. The channel works by "pushing" the transmitted codeword towards a different valid codeword (selected at random). This simple channel adds at most n/4 errors in expectation. We can get a channel with a hard bound on the number of errors by allowing it logarithmic space. Our impossibility result can be seen as strengthening a result by Dey et al. [9] for online channels in the special case where p > 1/4, though our proof technique, adapted from Ahlswede [1] , is quite different. Appendix C contains a detailed proof. ). For every pair of randomized encoding/decoding algorithms Enc, Dec that make N uses of the channel and use a message space whose size tends to infinity with N , for every 0 < ν < 1 4 , there is an online space-log(N ) channel W 2 that alters at most N ( 1 4 + ν) bits and causes a uniformly random message to be incorrectly decoded with probability at least C · ν for an absolute constant C.
For list-decoding, we provide a positive result, namely, a construction of codes with rate approaching 1 − H(p) that efficiently recover a short list containing the correct message when the channel uses logarithmic space. For details of the construction and analysis, see Section 7. The structure of the code is similar to the uniquely decodable code for additive errors; however, additional work is needed to make the codewords appear pseudorandom to the channel, and the analysis is more subtle.
Theorem 3.4. For every p ∈ (0, 1/2) and constant ε > 0, there is an efficient Monte Carlo construction of a stochastic code with encoding/decoding algorithms (Enc, Dec) such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1} (1−H(p)−ε)N and every randomized online space-S channel W S on N input bits that is pN -bounded (where Ω(log N ) S o(N/ log N )), with high probability over the choice of coins r and the errors introduced by W S , Dec(W S (Enc(m; r))) outputs a list of at most poly(1/ε) messages that includes the correct message m.
The probability of incorrect decoding is at most N 2 −Ω(ε 3 S) + 2 −Ω(ε 3 N/S) , and the running time of (Enc, Dec) is is polynomial in N and 2 S (and therefore polynomial in N for log-space channels).
List-decoding for Time-bounded Channels
Finally, we prove a similar result for time-bounded channels, assuming the existence of certain pseudorandom generators (which in turn follow from standard complexity assumptions). The model here is easy to describe: it suffices that the channel be implementable by a circuit of size N c for some c 1. 
List decoding implies codes for worst-case additive errors
In this section, we will demonstrate how to use good linear list-decodable codes to get good stochastic codes. The conversion uses the list-decodable code as a black-box and loses only a negligible amount in rate. In particular, by using binary linear codes that achieve list decoding capacity, we get stochastic codes which achieve the capacity for additive errors. The linearity of the code is crucial for this construction. The other ingredient we need for the construction is an authentication code (called an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code) that can detect additive corruption with high probability [5] .
Some coding terminology
We begin with the definitions relating to list decoding and stochastic codes for additive errors.
Definition 2 (List decodable codes). For a real p, 0 < p < 1, and an integer L 1, a code C ⊆ Σ n is said to be (p, L)-list decodable if for every y ∈ Σ n there are at most L codewords of C within Hamming distance pn from y. If for every y the list of L codewords within Hamming distance pn from y can be found in time polynomial in n, then we say C is efficiently (p, L)-list decodable. Note that (p, 1)-list decodability is equivalent to the distance of C being greater than 2pn. P An efficiently (p, L)-list decodable code can be used for communication on the ADV p channel with the guarantee that the decoder can always find a list of at most L messages that includes the correct message.
Definition 3 (Stochastic codes and their decodability). A stochastic binary code of rate R and block length n is given by an encoding function Enc : {0, 1} Rn × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} n which encodes the Rn message bits together with some additional random bits into an n-bit codeword.
Such a code is said to be (efficiently) p-decodable with probability 1−δ if there is a (deterministic polynomial time computable) decoding function Dec : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} Rn ∪ {⊥} such that for every m ∈ {0, 1} Rn and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n of Hamming weight at most pn, with probability at least 1 − δ over the choice of a random string ω ∈ {0, 1} b , we have
Though we do not require it in the definition, our constructions in this section of stochastic codes from list-decodable codes will also have the desirable property that when the number of errors exceeds pn, with high probability the decoder will output a decoding failure rather than decoding incorrectly.
Algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes
The following is not the most general definition of AMD codes from [5] , but will suffice for our purposes and is the one we will use. Definition 4. Let G = (G 1 , G 2 , G 3 ) be a triple of abelian groups (whose group operations are written additively) and δ > 0 be a real. Let G = G 1 × G 2 × G 3 be the product group (with component-wise addition). An (G, δ)-algebraic manipulation code, or (G, δ)-AMD code for short, is given by a map f : G 1 × G 2 → G 3 with the following property:
For every x ∈ G 1 , and all
where the decoding function D : G → G 1 ∪ {⊥} is given by D((x, r, s)) = x if f (x, r) = s and ⊥ otherwise. The tag size of the AMD code is defined as log |G 2 | + log |G 3 | -it is the number of bits the AMD encoding appends to the source. P Intuitively, the AMD allows one to authenticate x via a signed form (x, r, f (x, r)) so that an adversary who manipulates the signed value by adding an offset ∆ cannot cause incorrect decoding of some x = x. The following concrete scheme from [5] achieves near optimal tag size and we will make use of it.
Theorem 4.1. Let F be a finite field of size q and characteristic p, and d be a positive integer such that d + 2 is not divisible by p. Then the function f 
Combining list decodable and AMD codes
Using a (p, L)-list decodable code C of length n, for any error pattern e of weight at most pn, we can recover a list of L messages that includes the correct message m. We would like to use the stochastic portion of the encoding to allow us to unambiguously pick out m from this short list. The key insight is that if C is a linear code, then the other (less than L) messages in the list are all fixed offsets of m that depend only on the error pattern e. So if prior to encoding by the list-decodable code C, the messages are themselves encodings as per a good AMD code, and the tag portion of the AMD code is good for these fixed L or fewer offsets, then we can uniquely detect m from the list using the AMD code. If the tag size of the DMD code is negligible compared to the message length, then the overall rate is essentially the same as that of the list-decodable code.
Since there exist binary linear (p, L)-list-decodable codes of rate approaching 1 − H(p) for large L, this gives stochastic codes (in fact, strongly decodable stochastic codes) of rate approaching 1−H(p) for correcting up to a fraction p of worst-case additive errors. 
AMD be the function from Theorem 4.1 for the choice F = F 2 b . Let C be the stochastic binary code with encoding map E : {0,
δ L , the stochastic code C is strongly p-decodable with probability 1 − δ. If C is efficiently (p, L)-list decodable, then C is efficiently (and strongly) p-decodable with probability 1 − δ.
Moreover, even when e has weight greater than pn, the decoder detects this and outputs ⊥ (a decoding failure) with probability at least 1 − δ.
Note that the rate of C is d d+2 times the rate of C.
Proof. Fix an error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n and a message m ∈ {0, 1} bd . Suppose we pick a random r and transmit E(m, r), so that y = E(m, r) + e was received. The decoding function D, on input y, first runs the list decoding algorithm for C to find a list of L messages m 1 , . . . , m whose encodings are within distance pn of y. It then decomposes m i as (m i , r i , s i ) in the obvious way. The decoder then checks if there is a unique index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , } for which f
Let us now analyze the above decoder D. First consider the case when wt(e) pn. In this case we want to argue that the decoder correctly outputs (m, r) with probability at least 1 − δ (over the choice of r). Note that in this case one of the m i 's equals (m, r, f AMD (m 1 , r 1 ) = s 1 will be met and we only need to worry about this happening for some i > 1 also.
Let e i = y − C(m i ) be the associated error vectors for the messages m i . Note that e 1 = e. By linearity of C, the e i 's only depend on e; indeed if c 1 , . . . , c are all the codewords of C within distance pn from e, then e i = c i + e. Let ∆ i be the pre-image of c i , i.e., c i = C(∆ i ). Therefore we have m i = m 1 + ∆ i where the ∆ i 's only depend on e. By the AMD property, for each i > 1, the probability that f In the case when wt(e) > pn, the same argument shows that the check f
AMD (m i , r i ) = s i passes with probability at most δ/L for each i (including i = 1). So with probability at least 1 − δ none of the checks pass, and the decoder outputs ⊥.
Plugging into the above theorem the existence of binary linear (p, O(1/ε))-list-decodable codes of rate 1 − H(p) − ε/2, and picking d = 2 c 0 /ε + 1 for some absolute constant c 0 , we can conclude the following result on existence of stochastic codes achieving capacity for reliable communication against additive errors. Corollary 4.3. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there exists a family of stochastic codes of rate at least 1 − H(p) − ε, which are strongly p-decodable with probability at least 1 − 2 −c(ε,p)n where n is the block length and c(ε, p) is a constant depending only on ε and p. Moreover, when more than a fraction p of errors occur, the code is able to detect this and report a decoding failure with probability at least 1 − 2 −c(ε,p)n .
Remark 1.
For the above construction, if the decoding succeeds, it correctly computes in addition to the message m also the randomness r used at the encoder. So the construction also gives deterministic codes for the "average error criterion" where for every error vector, all but an exponentially small fraction of messages are communicated correctly. See Appendix B for a discussion of codes for this model and their relation to stochastic codes for additive errors.
Overview of Explicit Constructions
Codes for Additive Errors. Our result is obtained by combining several ingredients from pseudorandomness and coding theory. At a high level the idea (introduced by Lipton [27] in the context of shared randomness) is that if we permute the symbols of the codewords randomly after the error pattern is fixed, then the adversarial error pattern looks random to the decoder. Therefore, an explicit code C BSC that can achieve capacity for the binary symmetric channel (such as Forney's concatenated code [12] ) can be used to communicate on ADV p after the codeword's symbols are randomly permuted. This allows one to achieve capacity against adversarial errors when the encoder and decoder share randomness that is unknown to the adversary causing the errors. But, crucially, this requires the decoder to know the random permutation used for encoding.
Our encoder communicates the random permutation (in encoded form) also as part of the overall codeword, without relying on any shared randomness, public key, or other "extra" information. The decoder must be able to figure out the permutation correctly, based solely on a noisy version of the overall codeword (that encodes the permutation plus the actual data). The seed used to pick this random permutation (plus some extra random seeds needed for the construction) is encoded by a low rate code that can correct several errors (say, a Reed-Solomon code) and this information is dispersed into randomly located blocks of the overall codeword (see Figure 1 ). The locations of the control blocks are picked by a "sampler" -the seed for this sampler is also part of the control information along with the seed for the random permutation.
The key challenge is to ensure that the decoder can figure out which blocks encode the control information, and which blocks consist of "data" bits from the codeword of C BSC (the "payload" codeword) that encodes the actual message. The control blocks (which comprise a tiny portion of the overall codeword) are further encoded by a stochastic code (call it the control code) that can correct somewhat more than a fraction p, say a fraction p + ε, of errors. These codes can have any constant rate -since they encode a small portion of the message their rate is not so important, so we can use explicit sub-optimal codes for this purpose.
Together with the random placement of the encoded control blocks, the control code ensures that a reasonable (Ω(ε)) fraction of the control blocks (whose encodings by the control code incur fewer than p + ε errors) will be correctly decoded. Moreover, blocks with too many errors will be flagged as erasures with high probability. The fraction of correctly recovered control blocks will be large enough that all the control information can be recovered by decoding the Reed-Solomon code used to encode the control information into these blocks. This recovers the permutation used to scramble the symbols of the concatenated codeword. The decoder can then unscramble the symbols in the message blocks and run the standard algorithm for the concatenated code to recover the message.
One pitfall in the above approach is that message blocks could potentially get mistaken for corrupted control blocks and get decoded as erroneous control information that leads the whole algorithm astray. To prevent this, in addition to scrambling the symbols of the message blocks by a (pseudo)random permutation, we also add a pseudorandom offset (which is nearly t-wise independent for some t much larger than the length of the blocks). This will ensure that with high probability each message block will be very far from every codeword and therefore will not be mistaken for a control block.
An important issue we have glossed over is that a uniformly random permutation of the n bits of the payload codeword would take Ω(n log n) bits to specify. This would make the control information too big compared to the message length; we need it to be a tiny fraction of the message length. We therefore use almost t-wise independent permutations for t ≈ εn/ log n. Such permutations can be sampled with ≈ εn random bits. We then make use of the fact that C BSC enables reliable decoding even when the error locations have such limited independence instead of being a uniformly random subset of all possible locations [35] .
Extending the Construction to log-space and poly-time channels. The construction for additive channels does not work against more powerful channels for (at least) two reasons:
(i) A more powerful channel may inject a large number of correctly formatted control blocks into the transmitted word (recall, each of the blocks is quite small). Even if the real control blocks are uncorrupted, the decoder will have trouble determining which of the correct-looking control blocks is in fact legitimate.
(ii) Since the channel can decide the errors after seeing parts of the codeword, it may be able to learn which blocks of the codeword contain the control information and concentrate errors on those blocks. Similarly, we have to ensure that the channel does not learn about the permutation used to scramble the payload codeword and thus cause a bad error pattern that cannot be decoded by the standard decoder for the concatenated code.
The first obstacle is the easier one to get around, and we do so by using list-decoding: although the channel may inject spurious possibilities for the control information, the total number of such spurious candidates will be bounded. This ensures that after list decoding, provided at least a small fraction of the true control blocks do not incur too many errors, the list of candidates will include the correct control information with high probability.
To overcome the second obstacle, we make sure, using appropriate pseudorandom generators and employing a "hybrid" argument, that the encoding of the message is indistinguishable from a random string by a computationally limited channel (such as one restricted to be online log-space or polynomial time bounded), even when the channel has knowledge of the message and certain parts of the control information. (For concreteness, let us focus on the online log-space case in the following discussion.) This ensures that the distribution of errors caused by the channel on the codeword is indistinguishable by online log-space tests from the distribution caused by the channel on a uniformly random string. Note that the latter distribution is oblivious to the codeword. If these error distributions were in fact statistically close (and not just close w.r.t. online log-space tests), successful decoding under oblivious errors would also imply successful decoding under the error distribution caused by the online log-space channel.
The condition that enough control blocks have at most a fraction p + ε of errors can be checked in online log-space given non-uniform knowledge of the location of the control blocks. We use this together with the above indistinguishability to first prove that enough control blocks are correctly list-decoded, and thus the correct control information is among the candidates obtained by list decoding the control code.
The next step is to show that the payload codeword is correctly decoded given knowledge of the correct control information. Towards this goal, we argue that certain events that imply successful decoding of the concatenated payload codeword, and which we showed to occur with high probability against oblivious errors, also happen with good probability against errors caused by the online log-space channel. The natural approach towards this is to show that assuming this is not the case, one can construct an online log-space distinguisher for the error distributions thereby contradicting their computational indistinguishability. Indeed, this can essentially be shown in the case of polynomial-time bounded channels. This part is harder for the space-bounded case, since Nisan's generator only ensures that the error distribution caused by the channel is indistinguishable from oblivious errors by online space-bounded machines. However, the unscrambling of the error vector (according to the permutation that was applied to the payload codeword) cannot be done in an online fashion. So we have to resort an indirect argument based on showing limited independence of certain events related to the payload decoding.
Explicit Codes of Optimal Rate for Additive Errors
This section describes our construction of codes for additive errors.
Ingredients
Our construction uses a number of tools from coding theory and pseudorandomness. These are described in detail in Appendix A. Briefly, we use:
, that is efficiently decodable with probability 1 − c 1 /N from a fraction p + O(ε) of additive errors. decodable with probability 1 − c 1 /N . These codes are obtained via Theorem 3.1 (see Proposition A.1 in the appendix) .
• A rate O(ε) Reed-Solomon code RS which encodes a message as the evaluation of a polynomial at points α 1 , ..., α in such a way that an efficient algorithm RS-Decode can efficiently recover the message given at most ε /4 correct symbols and at most ε/24 incorrect ones.
• A randomness-efficient sampler Samp : {0, 1} σ → [N ] , such that for any subset B ⊆ [N ] of size at least µN , the output set of the sampler intersects with B in roughly a µ fraction of its size, that is |Samp(s) ∩ B| ≈ µ|Samp(s)|, with high probability over s ∈ {0, 1} σ . We use an expander-based construction from Vadhan [38] .
• A generator KNR : {0, 1} σ → S n for an (almost) t-wise independent family of permutations of the set {1, ..., n}, that uses a seed of σ = O(t log n) random bits (Kaplan, Naor, and Reingold [22] ).
• A generator POLY t : {0, 1} σ → {0, 1} n for a t-wise independent distribution of bit strings of length n, that uses a seed of σ = O(t log n) random bits.
• An explicit efficiently decodable, rate
can correct a p fraction of t-wise independent errors, that is: for every message m ∈ {0, 1} Rn , and every error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n of Hamming weight at most pn, we have REC-Decode(REC(m) + π(e)) = m with probability at least 1−2 −Ω(ε 2 t) over the choice of a permutation π ∈ R range(KNR).
(Here π(e) denotes the permuted vector: π(e) i = e π(i) .) A standard family of concatenated codes satisfies this property (Smith [35] ).
Analysis
The following (Theorem 3.2, restated) is our result on explicit construction of capacity-achieving codes for additive errors.
Theorem 6.1. For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, the functions Encode, Decode (Algorithms 1 and 2) form an explicit, efficiently encodable and decodable stochastic code with rate R = 1 − H(p) − ε such that for every m ∈ {0, 1} RN and error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N of Hamming weight at most pN , we have Pr ω Decode(Encode(m; ω) + e) = m 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 2 N/ log 2 N ))), where N is the block length of the code.
With all the ingredients described in Section A in place, we can describe and analyze the code of Theorem 6.1. The encoding algorithm is given in Algorithm 1 (page 16). The corresponding decoder is given in Algorithm 2 (page 17). Also, a schematic illustration of the encoding is in Figure 1 . The reader might find it useful to keep in mind the high level description from Section 5 when reading the formal description.
Starting the Proof of Theorem 6.1. First, note that the rate R of the overall code approaches the Shannon bound: R is almost equal to the rate R of the code REC used to encode the actual message bits m, since the encoded control information has length O(εN ). The code REC needs to correct a fraction p + 25Λε of t-wise independent errors, so we can pick
We now turn to the analysis of the decoder. Fix a message m ∈ {0, 1} R·N and an error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N with Hamming weight at most pN . Suppose that we run Enc on m and coins ω chosen independently of the pair m, e, and let x = Enc(m; ω) + e. The decoder parses x into blocks x 1 , ..., x n + of length Λ log N , corresponding to the blocks output by the encoder.
The four lemmas below, proved in Section 6.3, show that the decoder recovers the control information correctly with high probability. We then show that the payload message is correctly recovered. The proof of the theorem is completed in Section 6.4.
The lemmas illuminate the roles of the main pseudorandom objects in the construction. First, the sampler seed is used to ensure that errors are not concentrated on the control blocks, as captured in the next lemma:
Definition 5 (Good sampler seeds). A sampled set T is good for error vector e if the fraction of control blocks with relative error rate at most p + ε is at least ε 2 . P Lemma 6.2 (Good sampler lemma). For any error vector e of relative weight at most p, with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N ) over the choice of sampler seed s T , the set T is good for e.
Given a good sampler seed, the properties of the stochastic code SC guarantee that many control blocks are correctly interpreted. Specifically: Lemma 6.3 (Control blocks lemma). For all e, T such that T is good for e, with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N )) over the random coins (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r ) used by the SC encodings, we have: (i) The number of control blocks correctly decoded by SC-Decode is at least (By erroneously decoded, we mean that SC-Decode outputs neither ⊥ nor the correct message.)
The offset ∆ is then used to ensure that payload blocks are not mistaken for control blocks: Lemma 6.4 (Payload blocks lemma). For all m, e, s T , s π , with probability at least
over the offset seed s ∆ , the number of payload blocks incorrectly accepted as control blocks by SC-Decode is less than ε 24 . The two previous lemmas imply that the Reed-Solomon decoder will, with high probability, be able to recover the control information. Specifically: Lemma 6.5 (Control Information Lemma). For any m and e, with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(ε 2 N/ log 2 N ) over the choice of the control information and the coins of SC, the control information is correctly recovered, that is (s T ,s ∆ ,s π ) = (s T , s ∆ , s π ). Algorithm 1. Encode: On input parameters N, p, ε (with p + ε < 1/2), and message m ∈ {0, 1} R·N , where
£ Here c0 is the expansion of the stochastic code from Theorem 3.1 that can correct a fraction p + ε of errors.
n ← N Λ log N £ The final codeword consists of n blocks of length Λ log N . ← 24εN/ log N £ The control codeword is blocks long. n ← n − and N ← n · (Λ log N ) £ The payload codeword is n blocks long (i.e. N bits).
Phase 1: Generate control information
Phase 2: Encode control information
Encode ω with a Reed-Solomon code RS to get symbols (a 1 , ..., a ). £ RS is a rate
Reed-Solomon code of length 24εN = 8 ε · |ω| bits which evaluates polynomials at points (α1, . . . , α ) in a field F of size ≈ N .
5:
Encode each symbol together with its evaluation point: For i = 1, ..., , do
£ We add location information to each RS symbol to handle insertions and deletions.
• C i ← SC(A i , r i ), where r i is random of length 2 log N bits.
£ SC = SC 2 log N,p+ε : {0, 1}
2 log N ×{0, 1} 2 log N → {0, 1} Λ log N is a stochastic code that can correct a fraction (p + ε) of additive errors with probability 1 − c1/N 2 > 1 − 1/N as per Proposition A.1.
Phase 3: Generate the payload codeword 6: Encode m using a code that corrects random errors:
N is a code that corrects a p + 25Λε fraction of t-wise independent errors, as per Proposition A.7 . Here R = RN N . 7: Expand the seeds s T , s ∆ , s π to get a set T = Samp(s T ), offset ∆ = POLY(s ∆ ), and permutation π = KNR(s π ).
8: Scramble the payload codeword:
• π −1 (P ) ← (bits of P permuted according to π −1 )
..B n of length Λ log N bits.
Phase 4: Interleave blocks of payload codeword and control codeword 9: Interleave control blocks C 1 , ..., C with payload blocks B 1 , ..., B n , using control blocks in positions from T and payload blocks in remaining positions.
Algorithm 2. Decode: On input x of length N :
1: Cut x into n + blocks x 1 , ..., x n + of length Λ log(n) each.
2: Attempt to decode control blocks: For i = 1, ..., n + , do
£ With high prob, non-control blocks are rejected (Lemma 6.4), and control blocks are either correctly decoded or discarded (Lemma 6.3).
• IfF i =⊥, then parseF i as (α i ,ã i ), whereα i ,ã i ∈ F.
£ Control information is recovered w.h.p. (Lemma 6.5).
4: Expand the seedss T ,s ∆ ,s π to get setT , offset∆, and permutationπ.
5:Q ← concatenation of blocks x i not inT £ Fraction of errors inQ is at most p + O(ε).
6:P ← π(Q ⊕∆) £ If control info is correct, then errors inP are almost t-wise independent.
7:m ← REC-Decode(P ) £ Run the decoder from Proposition A.7.
Remark 2. It would be interesting to achieve an error probability of 2 −Ωε(N ) , i.e., a positive "error exponent," in Theorem 6.1 instead of the 2 −Ωε(N/ log 2 N ) bound we get. A more careful analysis (perhaps one that works with almost t -wise independent offset ∆) can probably improve our error probability to 2 −Ωε(N/ log N ) , but going further using our approach seems difficult. The existential result due to Csiszár and Narayan [7] achieves a positive error exponent for all rates less than capacity, as does our existence proof using list decoding in Section 4.3.
Remark 3.
A slight modification of our construction give codes for the "average error criterion," in which the code is deterministic but the message is assumed to be unknown to the channel and the goal is to ensure that for every error vector most messages are correctly decoded; see Theorem B.3 in Appendix B.
Proofs of Lemmas used in Theorem 6.1
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Let B ⊂ [n] = [n + ] be the set of blocks that contain a (p + ε) or smaller fraction of errors. We first prove that B must occupy at least an ε fraction of total number of blocks: to see why, let γ be the proportion of blocks which have error rate at most (p + ε). The total fraction of errors in x is then at least (1 − γ)(p + ε). Since this fraction is at most p by assumption, we must have 1 − γ p/(p + ε). So γ ε/(p + ε) > ε. Next, we show that the number of control blocks that have error rate at most p+ε cannot be too small. The error e is fixed before the encoding algorithm is run, and so the sampler seed s T is chosen independently of the set B. Thus, the fraction of control blocks in B will be roughly ε. Specifically, we can apply Proposition A.4 with µ = ε (since B occupies at least an ε fraction of the set of blocks), θ = ε/2 and σ = ε 2 N . We get that the error probability γ is exp(−Ω(θ 2 )) = exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N ).
(Note that for constant ε, the seed length σ = ε 2 N log N + log(1/ε) is large enough for the proposition to apply.)
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Fix e and the sampled set T which is good for e. Consider a particular received block x i that corresponds to control block j, that is, x i = C j + e i . The key observation is that the error vector e i depends on e and the sampler seed T , but it is independent of the randomness used by SC to generate C j . Given this observation, we can apply Proposition A.1 directly: (a) If block i has error rate at most p + ε, then SC-Decode decodes correctly with probability at least 1 − c 1 /N 2 1 − 1/N over the coins of SC.
(b) If block i has error rate more than p + ε, then SC-Decode outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1 − c 1 /N 2 1 − 1/N over the coins of SC.
Note that in both statements (a) and (b), the probability need only be taken over the coins of SC.
Consider Y, the the number of control blocks that either (i) have "low" error rate ( p + ε) yet are not correctly decoded, or (ii) have high error rate, and are not decoded as ⊥. Because statements (a) and (b) above depend only on the coins of SC, and these coins are chosen independently in each block, the variable Y is statistically dominated by a sum of independent Bernoulli variables with probability 1/N of being 1. Thus E [Y] /N < 1. By a standard additive Chernoff bound, the probability that Y exceeds ε /24 is at most exp(−Ω(ε 2 )). The bound on Y implies both the bounds in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. Consider a block x i that corresponds to payload block j, that is, x i = B j + e i . Fix e, s T , and s π . The offset ∆ is independent of these, and so we may write x i = y i + ∆ i , where y i is fixed independently of ∆ i . Since ∆ is a t -wise independent string with t = Ω(ε 2 N/ log N ) much greater than the size Λ log N of each block, the string ∆ i is uniformly random in {0, 1} Λ log N . Hence, so is x i . By Proposition A.1 we know that on input a random string, SC-Decode outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1 − c 1 /N 2 1 − 1/N Moreover, the t -wise independence of the bits of ∆ implies 
This bound implies the lemma statement.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. Suppose the events of Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4 occur, that is, for at least ε /4 of the control blocks the recovered valueF i is correct, at most ε /24 of the control blocks are erroneously decoded, and at most ε /24 of the payload blocks are mistaken for control blocks.
Because the blocks of the control information come with the (possibly incorrect) evaluation pointsα i , we are effectively given a codeword in the Reed-Solomon code defined for the related point set {α i }. Now, the degree of the polynomial used for the original RS encoding is d * = |ω|/ log(N ) − 1 < 3ε 2 N/ log N = ε /8. Of the pairs (α i ,ã i ) decoded by SC-Decode, we know at least ε 4 are correct (these pairs will be distinct), and at most 2· ε 24 are incorrect (some of these pairs may occur more than once, or even collide with one of the correct). If we eliminate any duplicate pairs and then run the decoding algorithm from Proposition A.2, the control information ω will be correctly recovered as long as the number of correct symbols exceeds the number of wrong symbols by at least d * + 1. This requirement is met if Taking a union bound over the events of Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, we get that the probability that the control information is correctly decoded is at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 2 N/ log 2 N )), as desired.
Completing the Proof of Main Theorem 6.1
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We will first prove that the decoding of the payload codeword succeeds assuming the correct control information ω = (s π , s ∆ , s T ) is handed directly to the decoder, i.e., in the "shared randomness" setting. We will then account for the fact that we must condition on the correct recovery of the control information ω by the first stage of the decoder. Fix a message m, error vector e, and sampler seed s T , and let e Q be the restriction of e to the payload codeword, i.e., blocks not in T . The relative weight of e Q is at most
) (for sufficiently small ε). Now since s π is selected independently from T , the permutation π is independent of the payload error e Q . Consider the stringP that is input the the REC decoder. We can writeP =π(Q ⊕∆) = π(Q ⊕ e Q ⊕ ∆). Because a permutation of the bit positions is a linear permutation of Z N 2 , we get
Thus the input to REC is corrupted by a fraction of at most p(1 + 25Λε) errors which are t-wise independent, in the sense of Proposition A.7 [35] . Thus, with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(ε 2 t) = 1 − e −Ω(ε 4 N/ log N ) , the message m is correctly recovered by Decode.
In the actual decoding, the control information is not handed directly to the decoder. Letω be the candidate control information recovered by the decoder (in Step 8 of the algorithm). The above suite of lemmas (Lemmas 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5) show that the control information is correctly recovered, i.e.,ω = ω, with probability at least exp(−Ω(ε 2 N/ log 2 N ))).
The overall probability of success is given by 
Because ε is a constant relative to log N , it is the former probability that dominates. This completes the analysis of the decoder and the proof of Theorem 6.1.
7 Capacity-achieving codes for online space-bounded channels
In this section, we outline a Monte Carlo algorithm that, for any desired error fraction p ∈ (0, 1/2), produces a code of rate close to 1 − H(p) which can be efficiently list decoded from errors caused by an arbitrary randomized online log-space channel that corrupts at most a fraction p of symbols with high probability. Recall that for p > 1/4, resorting to list decoding is necessary even for very simple (constant space) channels. If the channel is allowed a space bound S = o(N/ log N ), our construction and decoding times are polynomial in the block length N of the code and 2 S .
Channel models and branching programs
We model space-bounded online channels as a restricted form of bounded-width branching programs. Galil et al. [13] formulated a uniform version of this model, with finite automata replacing branching programs. We use a nonuniform model since it simplifies several proofs and captures a broader class of channels, including AVC's.
Definition 6 (Branching programs).
A layered, oblivious branching program of width 2 S and length is a sequence of transition functions F i : Q × {0, 1} → Q, where Q = {0, 1} S is a set of 2 S states, together with a start state q 0 ∈ Q, an input map
, and an output map Out : Q → {0, 1}. On input a binary string (x 1 x 2 · · · x N ) ∈ {0, 1} N , the program computes
The (binary) output of the program is Out(q ).
We define an online branching program of width 2 S as a special case of the above, in which = N and I is the identity function, so that q i = F i (q i−1 , x i ). Such a program is essentially a nonuniform finite automaton, for which the transition function can change from symbol to symbol. A randomized online branching program is a probability distribution over (deterministic) online branching programs (of the same input length and width bound).
To model space-bounded channels (as opposed to Boolean functions), we augment the standard branching program model with the ability to output bits at each phase. Def. 1 restated) ). An online space-S channel is a readonce width-2 S branching program that outputs one bit at each computation step. Specifically, let Q = {0, 1} S be a set of 2 S states. For input length N , the channel is given by a sequence of N transition functions F i : Q × {0, 1} → Q × {0, 1}, for i = 1 to N , along with a start state q 0 ∈ Q. On input x = (x 1 x 2 · · · x N ) ∈ {0, 1} N , the channel computes (q i , y i ) = F i (q i−1 , x i ) for i = 1 to N . The output of the channel, which is denoted A(x), is y = (y 1 y 2 · · · y N ) ∈ {0, 1} N .
Definition 7 (Space bounded channels (
A randomized (online space-S channel is a probability distribution over the space of deterministic (online space-S) channels. For a given input x, such a channel induces a corresponding distribution on outputs. A randomized channel A is pN -bounded with probability 1 − β if, for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1} N , with probability at least 1 − β, the channel flips fewer than pN bits of x, that is
Remark 4 (Bounded Lookahead). We may also consider a model in which the channel bases its decision about which bits to flip not only on positions seen so far, but some number of positions in the future. A channel with look-ahead t is specified by N + t transition functions. The input is augmented with t extra dummy bits, i.e. x = x 0 t , and the output of the channel is the last N bits produced by the transition functions, that is y = y t+1 y t+2 · · · y t+N . The results of this section extend directly to channels with O(S) look-ahead.
Nisan's pseudorandom generator
The encoding function of our code will make use of Nisan's pseudorandom generator for fooling space bounded algorithms, or in the non-uniform setting, bounded width branching programs. We first define the notion of indistinguishability of two distributions relative to a function. 
where U t denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1} t . For such a generator, s is called its seed length, and 2 −S its error.
Code construction and ingredients
We will use the same high level approach from our construction for the additive errors case, with some components changed, and with a seed in the control information to obtain an offset that looks uniformly random to online log-space bounded channels.
Parameters. Input parameters of the construction: N, p, S, ε, where (i) N is the block length of the final code,
(ii) pN is the bound on the number of errors introduced (0 < p < 1/2) by the channel w.h.p.
(iii) S is a bound on the space of the online channel (as per Definition 7), such that S is both Ω(log N ) and o(N/ log N ).
(iv) ε is a measure of how far the rate is from the optimal bound of 1 − H(p) (that is, the rate must be at least 1 − H(p) − ε). We will assume 0 < 2ε < 1/2 − p.
The seeds/control information. The control information ω will consist of three randomly chosen strings s π , s T , s Γ where s π , s T are as in the additive errors case. We will take the lengths of s π , s T be ζN where ζ = ζ(p, ε) will be chosen small enough compared to ε (the exact choice of ζ is not too important, but we remark that choosing, say, ζ = ε 10 should suffice).
The third string s Γ ∈ {0, 1} ζN will be a seed for Nisan's generator Nis for randomized online branching programs of width 2 2S with error η Nis 2 −2S . Since S o(N/ log N ), a seed length of ζN is sufficient for Nisan's generator from Theorem 7.1. The offset Γ ← Nis(s Γ ) will be used to fool the space-bounded channel. We won't need to add the t -wise independent offset ∆ as we did in the additive errors case.
Encoding the message. The payload codeword encoding a message m will be π −1 (REC(m)) ⊕Γ, which is the same as the encoding for the additive channel, with the offset Γ added to break dependencies in the log-space bounded channel instead of the t -wise independent offset ∆.
We will use the fact that REC is a concatenated code with the following standard components:
(i) an outer code REC out (over an alphabet of size 2 a for some constant a) of rate at least 1−ε/10 that can correct a constant fraction κ = κ(ε) of worst-case errors. As described in [17] , a variant of the expander codes construction of Spielman [36] gives such a construction (in fact with linear complexity encoding and decoding) with a = O(log(1/ε)) and κ = Ω(ε 2 ). Since we can always combine enough symbols to increase the alphabet size without compromising the fraction of correctable symbol errors, we will assume that a = Θ(1/ε 3 ).
(ii) an inner code REC in of dimension a, block length b data a/(1 − H(p) − ε/10) that is capacityachieving for the binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p with decoding error probability at most κ/10. Since a = Θ(1/ε 3 ) Ω(log(1/κ)/ε 2 ), such capacity-achieving codes exist by Shannon's theorem, and can be found in time exp(poly(1/ε)) (which is independent of n) by a brute-force search.
Thus the payload codeword will naturally be broken into n data "inner chunks" of size b data . This structure of REC will be important to argue that once the control information is correctly recovered, the decoder can find the actual message. This step is not as easy as in the additive errors case, since the error distribution is no longer a simple t-wise independent distribution but rather caused by an arbitrary space-bounded online channel.
For convenience, we will assume that b data will divide the size of the control blocks b ctrl (which will be Θ(log N )). Therefore, each block of the final codeword will either be a control block, or a payload block that consists of b ctrl /b data consecutive "inner chunks" of the concatenated payload codeword.
Encoding the seeds. The control information (consisting of the seeds s π , s T , s Γ ) will be encoded by a similar structure to the solution for the additive channel: a Reed-Solomon code of rate R RS = R RS (p, ε) concatenated with an inner stochastic code. But the stochastic code SC (of Proposition A.1) will now be replaced by a low-space pseudorandom code LSC with good list decoding properties and such that the stochastic encoding of every message according to the code is indistinguishable from a random string by a randomized online space-S channel.
The formal properties needed from LSC are stated in Proposition 7.2 below -we will apply the Proposition with the choice S 0 = 2S and list decoding radius δ = p + ε < 1/2 − ε, obtaining a code of block length 2Λ 0 S. The size b ctrl of the control blocks will be set to be equal to the block length 2Λ 0 S of LSC. Let n ctrl denote number of control blocks, which also equals the block length of the Reed-Solomon code. Note that
The encoding of control blocks is exactly as in the additive errors case, with LSC replacing SC. As in the additive errors case, the control blocks will be interspersed with the payload blocks at locations specified by the sampler's output on s T .
Rate of the code. The code encoding the control information is of some small constant rate R ctrl (p, ε) and the control information consists only of O(ζN ) bits. Given ε, we can select ζ small enough so that the control portion of the codeword only adds εN/2 bits to the overall encoding. The rate of REC is at least (1 − ε/10)(1 − H(p) − ε/10) 1 − H(p) − ε/5. So the rate of the overall stochastic code is at least 1 − H(p) − ε as desired.
We next formally state and prove the properties of the code LSC needed above, thus completing the description of the code and encoding function.
Low-space pseudorandom stochastic code
Definition 9 (Decomposable stochastic code). A binary stochastic code with encoding map E where E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} s → {0, 1} b is said to be decomposable if there exist functions E 1 : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} b and E 2 : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} b such that E(x, y) = E 1 (x) ⊕ E 2 (y) for every x, y. We say that such a encoding decomposes as E = [E 1 , E 2 ]. P Definition 10 (List-decodable low-space pseudorandom code). A decomposable binary stochastic code with encoding map E : {0,
is said to be a (δ, L)-list decodable (S, γ)-pseudorandom code if the following properties hold:
1. E is (δ, L)-list decodable, i.e., for every y ∈ {0, 1} b , there are at most L pairs (m, r) such that E(m, r) is within Hamming distance δb of y.
2. For every m ∈ {0, 1} k and every randomized online branching program B (that can depend on m, E 1 (m)) with b input bits and width 2 S , we have
The rate of such a code equals k/b, and its seed complexity is s. P
The construction of the necessary stochastic code, whose codewords look random to low-space channels, is guaranteed by the following lemma. Further, there exists a deterministic decoding procedure running in time 2 O(S 0 ) that, given a string y ∈ {0, 1} u , recovers the complete list of (at most L) pairs (m, r) whose encodings E(m, r) are within Hamming distance at most δu from y.
Proof. The existence will be shown by a probabilistic construction with a decomposable encoding E(m, r) = C(m) ⊕ BPPRG(r) where C will be (the encoding map of) a linear list-decodable code, and BPPRG will be a generator that fools width 2 S 0 branching programs, obtained by picking BPPRG(r) ∈ {0, 1} u independently and uniformly at random for each seed r. Here u = Λ 0 S 0 for a large enough absolute constant Λ 0 as in the statement of the Proposition. Note that the construction time is 2 O(u) = 2 O(S 0 ) .
List-decoding property. We adapt the proof that a truly random set is list-decodable. Let C ⊆ {0, 1} u be a linear (δ, L C = L C (δ))-list decodable code; such codes exist for rates less than 1 − H(δ) [16] , and can be constructed explicitly with positive rate R(δ) (1/2 − δ) Ω(1) > 0 for any constant δ < 1/2 with a list size L C 1/(1/2 − δ) O(1) [18] . We will show that the composed code E has constant list-size with high probability over the choice of BPPRG as long as the rate of the combined code is strictly less than 1 − H(δ).
Fix a ball B of radius δu in {0, 1} u , and let X denote the size of the intersection of the image of E with B . We can view the image of E as a union of 2 s sub-codes C r , where C r is the translated code C ⊕ BPPRG(r) (for r ∈ {0, 1} s ). Each sub-code C r is (δ, L C )-list-decodable since it is a translation of C. We can then write X = r∈{0,1} s X r , where X r is the size of C r ∩B . The X r are independent integer-valued random variables with range [0, L C ] and expectation
where R C denotes the rate of C. Therefore,
, where L = L(δ) is the desired list-decoding bound for the composed code E. We will set L = 3L C /α 0 . By the multiplicative Chernoff bound for bounded random variables, the probability (over the choice of BPPRG) that X > L is at most
Taking a union bound over all 2 u possible balls B , we get that with probability at least 1−2 −2u , the random choice of BPPRG satisfies the property that the decomposable stochastic code with encoding map E = C ⊕ BPPRG is (δ, L)-list-decodable.
Pseudorandomness. We now establish the pseudorandomness claim. It suffices to prove the pseudorandomness property against all deterministic online branching programs of width 2 S 0 , since a randomized online branching program is just a distribution over deterministic branching programs.
Fix an arbitrary codeword C(m). Consider the (multi)set X m = {C(m)⊕BPPRG(r)} as r varies over {0, 1} s . Each element of this set is chosen uniformly and independently at random from {0, 1} u . Fix an online width-2 S 0 branching program B. By a standard Chernoff bound, the probability, over the choice of X m , that Pr x∈Xm [B(x) = 1] deviates from the probability Pr[B(U u ) = 1] that B accepts a uniformly random string by more than ζ in absolute value, is at most exp(−Ω(ζ 2 |X m |)). For ζ = 2 −S 0 and |X m | = 2 s 2 10S 0 , this probability is at most exp(−Ω (2 8S 0 ) ).
The number of online branching programs of width 2 S 0 on u input bits is at most exp(O(S 0 u)2 S 0 ) exp(O(2 2S 0 )). By a union bound over all these branching programs, we conclude that except with probability at most exp(−2 Ω(S 0 ) ) over the choice of BPPRG, the following holds for every online width 2 S 0 branching program B with u inputs bits:
Since m was arbitrary, we have proved that the constructed stochastic code is (S 0 , 2 −S 0 )-pseudorandom with probability at least 1 − 2 −2u .
Decoding. Finally, it remains to justify the claim about the decoding procedure. Given a string y ∈ {0, 1} u , the decoding algorithm will go over all (m, r) ∈ {0, 1} k × {0, 1} s by brute force, and check for each whether dist(E(m, r), y) δu. By the list-decoding property, there will be at most L such pairs (m, r). The decoding complexity is 2 O(k+s) = 2 O(u) .
List decoding algorithm
The decoding algorithm will be similar to the additive case with the principal difference being that the inner stochastic codes will be decoded as per the procedure guaranteed in Proposition 7.2 (using time 2 O(S) for each block). For each block, we obtain a list of L possible pairs of the form (α i , a i ). These set of (at most N L pairs) are the fed into the polynomial time Reed-Solomon list decoding algorithm (guaranteed by Proposition A.3), which returns a list of poly(1/ε) values for the control information. This comprises the first phase of the decoder.
Once a list of control vectors is recovered, the second phase of the decoder will run the decoding algorithm for REC for each of these choices of the control information and recover a list of possible messages.
The steps to decode each of inner stochastic codes takes time 2 O(S) and decoding the ReedSolomon code as well as REC takes time polynomial in N . So the overall run time is polynomial in N and 2 S .
The main theorem about decoding is the following.
Theorem 7.3. Let W S be an arbitrary randomized online space-S channel on N input bits that is pN -bounded with probability 1 − β. Consider the code construction described in Section 7.3 using component codes REC, a Reed-Solomon code of small enough rate R RS , and the code LSC that is (p + ε, L)-list decodable and (2S, 2 −2S )-pseudorandom (which happens with 1 − 2 −Ω(S) probability).
Then for every message m, with high probability over the choice of control information s π , s T , s Γ and the errors introduced by W S , the list output by the above-mentioned list decoding algorithm includes the message m with probability at least
The running time of the decoding algorithm is polynomial in N and 2 S (and thus polynomially bounded in the block length if the space bound is logarithmic).
Since the construction of LSC in Proposition 7.2 guarantees the required pseudorandomness property with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(S) , setting S = Θ(log N ) in the above theorem implies our main result (Theorem 3.4) on capacity-achieving codes for list decoding on online log-space channels.
The novelty compared to the additive errors case is in the analysis of the decoder, which is more subtle since we have to deal with a much more powerful channel. The remainder of this section deals with this analysis, which will establish the validity of Theorem 7.3.
Analyzing Decoding: Main Steps
Our analysis requires two main claims.
Lemma 7.4 (Few Control Candidates). The decoder recovers a list of L
poly(1/ε) candidate values of the control information. With high probability (specifically, with probability at least 1 − β − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/S)) − (N + 1)2 2S assuming S > log N ), the list includes the correct value ω = (s π , s T , s Γ ) of the control information used at the encoder.
Lemma 7.5 (Payload decoding succeeds). Given the correct control information (π, T, Γ), the decoder succeeds with high probability. Specifically, the probability of successful decoding is at least 1 − β − N exp(−Ω(ε 3 S))).
Combining these two lemmas, which we prove in the next two sections, we get that except with probability at most 2β + exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/S)) + N exp(−Ω(ε 3 S)), the decoder recovers a list of at most L poly(1/ε) potential messages, one of which is the correct original message. This establishes Theorem 7.3.
Control Candidates Analysis
In this section we show that the decoder can recover a small list of candidate control strings, one of which is correct with high probability (Lemma 7.4).
Our analysis follows the case of additive errors, but the relaxed goal of list-decoding simplifies the analysis of this part considerably. Recall that the sampled set T is "good" for a particular error pattern (Definition 5) if at least a fraction ε of the n ctrl control blocks have an error rate (fraction of flipped bits) bounded above by p + ε.
There were four main lemmas in the analysis of additive errors. The first (Lemma 6.2) stated that the error pattern was good for T with high probability. A version of this lemma holds also for our space-bounded codes, although the analysis is significantly more subtle. Lemma 7.6 (Good Samplers: space-bounded analogue to Lemma 6.2). For every pN -bounded online space-S channel with S > log N and for every message m and permutation seed s π , with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N ) − (N + 1)2 −2S over the choice of sampler seed s T , the seed s Γ for the pseudorandom offset, the coins of the control encoding and the coins of the adversary, the set T is good for the error pattern e.
We defer the proof of this lemma to Section 7.8.2, after we establish a key tool called the "Hiding Lemma" which is also used in the analysis of the payload decoding. For now, we turn to the second lemma in the analysis of the control information decoding (Lemma 6.3 for additive errors), which stated that when the sampled positions T are good for the error pattern e, one can correctly recover enough control blocks with relatively few errors. This is no longer true in our setting, but we require only the following weaker statement.
Lemma 7.7 (Correct Control Blocks -list decoding version).
For any e, T such that T is good for e, the decoding algorithm for the inner codes LSC outputs a list of L symbols containing the correct symbol a i for at least
Proof. The list-decoding radius of the LSC code is set to be δ > p + ε, so all blocks with an error rate below p + ε produce a valid list.
The third lemma from the analysis of additive errors (Lemma 6.4), which previously stated that very few payload blocks are mistaken for control blocks, requires significant change. It is possible for the space-bounded channel to inject fake control blocks into the codeword (by changing a block to some pre-determined codeword of LSC). Therefore we can only say that the total number of candidate control blocks is small. Putting the pieces together to prove Lemma 7.4 Given Lemmas 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8, we only need to ensure that the rate R RS of the Reed-Solomon code used at the outer level to encode the control information is small enough so that list decoding is possible according to Proposition A.3 as long as (1) the number of data pairs n is at most N L 2Λ 0 S and (2) the number of agreements t is at least Θ( ε 2 N S ). The claimed list decoding is possible with rate R RS = O(ε 4 /L), and the list decoder will return at most O(L/ε 2 ) candidates for the control information. Since the list decoding radius δ of LSC was chosen to be δ = p + ε < 1/2 − ε, we have L 1/ε O(1) by the guarantee of Proposition 7.2, so the output list size is bounded by a polynomial in 1/ε. This proves Lemma 7.4; the claimed failure probability is obtained by adding the probability β that the channel flips more than pN bits, and the failure probability of the sampler from Lemma 7.6.
Payload Decoding Analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the decoding of the payload codeword and the task of proving Lemmas 7.6 ("good samplers") and 7.5 (correct final decoding). We first develop a key tool, the "Hiding Lemma."
The Hiding Lemma
Given a message m, and pseudorandom outputs π, T, Γ based on the seeds s π , s T , s Γ , let Enc(m; π, T, Γ, r 1 , ..., r n ctrl ) denote the output of the encoding algorithm when the r i 's are used as the random bits for the LSC encoding. Let Enc(m; π, T, ·) be a random encoding of the message m using a given π, T and selecting all other inputs at random.
Definition 11 (Conditional Indistinguishability). For random variables X, Y, Z with X, Y defined on {0, 1} N , and η 0, we say that X and Y are online space-S indistinguishable given Z with advantage η if for all values z of Z, and for all randomized online branching programs A z (that could depend nonuniformly on z) with N inputs and width 2 S , we have X η ≈ Az Y , where X and Y are conditioned on Z = z. P
The following crucial lemma lets us limit the damage that an online space-bounded channel can cause to our codewords. Lemma 7.9 (Hiding Lemma). For all messages m, sampler sets T and permutations π, the random variables Enc(m; π, T, ·) and U N (the uniform distribution on {0, 1} N ) are online space-2S indistinguishable given (m, π, T ) with advantage η, where η is at most N 2 −2S + η Nis (N + 1) · 2 −2S .
We defer the proof of the above lemma to the end of this section. First, we develop a useful corollary on error distributions.
Definition 12 (Error distributions
An important consequence of the Hiding Lemma is that even with the knowledge of π and T , the distribution of errors inflicted by a space-bounded channel on a codeword of our code and on a uniformly random string are indistinguishable by space-bounded tests. Proof. One can compose a distinguisher for the two error random variables with the channel W S to get a distinguisher for the original distributions of the Hiding Lemma. This composition can be achieved while maintaining the online restriction and the space usage is the sum of the space of W S and the distinguisher (that is, at most 2S).
Proof of the Hiding Lemma (Lemma 7.9)
Proof. The proof proceeds by hybrid argument. Fix m, π, T , and recall that |T | = n ctrl is the number of control blocks. Let D 0 be the random variable Enc(m; π, T, ·), and D 2 be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} N . We will define an intermediate random variable D 1 , in which the control blocks of D 0 are replaced by fresh uniformly random strings. We show that D 0 and D 2 are both indistinguishable from D 1 , and hence from each other.
For notational convenience, suppose that π is the identity permutation, and that the set T , which dictates the locations of the control blocks, occupies the last = n ctrl locations so that the control information is sent at the end of the codeword (the proof works identically for any other fixed pair T, π). Let the encoding LSC decompose as [C * , BPPRG]. We can then write D 0 as
where r i is the randomness used by the stochastic encoder LSC and c 1 , ..., c are codewords of C * . Similarly, we can write
If ν is the concatenated string BPPRG(r 1 ) · · · BPPRG(r ), then conditioned on m, π, T and Γ, any branching program that distinguishes D 1 from D 0 can be used to construct a branching program of the same complexity that distinguishes ν from uniform, by hard-wiring in the string (payload ⊕Γ c 1 · · · c ). By the (2S, 2 −2S )-pseudorandom property of LSC and a standard hybrid argument, no online space-2S branching program can distinguish ν from uniform with advantage better than · 2 −2S N 2 −2S . Hence D 0 and D 1 are indistinguishable with advantage greater than N 2 −2S .
We now show that D 1 and D 2 are indistinguishable with advantage greater than η Nis . Note that in both distributions, the last blocks are uniform and independent of the long payload block. A randomized online space-2S branching program A that distinguishes D 1 from D 2 with advantage η can be turned into a distinguisher B payload , defined by B payload (z) = A(z ⊕ payload U 1 · · · U ), that distinguishes Γ from uniform with advantage η. We can represent B payload as a randomized online branching program with the same width as A, that is, at most 2S. By the property of the pseudorandom generator Nis, we conclude that A's advantage in distinguishing D 1 from D 2 is at most η Nis 2 −2S .
Proof that Errors are Well Distributed (Lemma 7.6)
The fact that log-space errors are nearly oblivious (Corollary 7.10) allows us to apply much of the analysis from the additive channels setting directly. The main observation is that one can check in log-space whether a set T is good for a given error pattern.
Proof of Lemma 7.6. Recall that the sampled set T is "good" for a particular error pattern (Definition 5) if at least a fraction ε of the n ctrl control blocks have an error rate (fraction of flipped bits) bounded above by p + ε. We want to show that good sampler sets arise with high probability. Let GOOD T (e) be the predicate which tests if T is good for an error vector e. For a given T , one can evaluate GOOD T in space at most log N (one needs two counters of size roughly log(b ctrl ) and log(n ctrl ) < log(N/b ctrl ), respectively: one keeps track of the number of errors in a given block and the other, of the number of blocks seen so far where the number of errors is above the threshold).
Fix a sampler seed s T . Now consider a pN -bounded online space-S channel W S , for S > log(N ). By Corollary 7.10, the errors introduced by W S are indistinguishable by the test GOOD T from a random error pattern, E W S (U N ), that does not depend on T . Thus, for every T , we have Pr m,T,π fixed (T good for errors introduced by W S ) Pr
where the probability space on the left-hand side consists of the coins of W S and the offset seeds in the encoding, and the probability space on the right consists of the coins of W S and the uniform random string U N .
We can now average over the choice of T in (1). On the left-hand side, we get the overall probability of a good error pattern (this is the quantity we are trying to bound) for a fixed message m and permutation π. On the right-hand side, we get the probability that T is good for a pNbounded error vector drawn independently of T . Now the original "good sampler lemma" (Lemma 6.2) states that for every error vector e of relative weight at most p, with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N ) over the choice of sampler seed s T , the set T is good for e. This directly extends to error vectors drawn independently from T . We obtain Pr m,π fixed (T good for errors introduced by W S ) 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 3 N/ log N ) − (N + 1)2 −2S .
Proof of Lemma 7.5
Armed with the Hiding Lemma, we return to the task of proving Lemma 7.5 on the claim that the payload decoding succeeds. Recall that for this part, we can assume that the decoder is given the correct control information ω = (π, T, Γ). We are thus in the shared randomness setting. We will use the Hiding Lemma (actually, Corollary 7.10) to argue that the events that we needed to happen with high probability for successful decoding against additive errors (where the errors were oblivious to the codeword) will also happen with good probability against the online space-S channel W S . However, the high probability guarantee we will be able to prove is weaker, being 1 − N −Ω(1) when S = O(log N ).
In the following, we fix the message m and the choice T of the control block locations.
Definition 13 (Friendly errors).
For an error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N with Hamming weight at most pN , define e to be friendly for (π, T ) if the permuted error vector π(e |T ) is an error pattern on which the decoder for the code REC succeeds.
The decoder for REC is the standard "hard decoder" for concatenated codes: it decodes each inner block by brute force to the message in {0, 1} a whose encoding by REC in is closest to it, and runs a unique decoder to correct up to a fraction κ = κ(ε) of errors for the outer code REC out . By the linearity of REC, the success of the decoding depends only on the error pattern, and not on the message. In particular, e is friendly for (π, T ) if and only if decoding π(e |T ) leads to the all zeroes message.
The following key lemma says that the error caused by any randomized online space-S bounded channel is likely to be friendly and thus lead to successful decoding of REC. This lemma immediately implies Lemma 7.5.
Lemma 7.11 (Errors are likely to be friendly). Let W S be any randomized online space-S channel on N bits that causes at most pN errors with probability 1 − β. For all subsets T of control block locations, with probability at least
(taken over π and the choice of e according to E W S (Enc(m; T, ·))), e is friendly for (π, T ).
The proof of the above lemma (which appears in Section 7.8.4 below) is one of key difficulties in the analysis compared to the additive errors case. Another principal difference was that we could not argue that the number of payload blocks mistaken for control blocks was small, but allowing for list decoding enabled getting around this difficulty relatively easily.
Proof of Lemma 7.11
Let us denote W = W S for ease of notation. Our plan to prove Lemma 7.11 is the following: By Corollary 7.10 of the Hiding Lemma, we know that E W (Enc(m; T, ·)) is online space-S indistinguishable (with advantage (N + 1)2 −2S ) from E W (U N ). The latter error distribution is oblivious to the actual codeword, and so by the analysis of the additive errors case (proof of Theorem 6.1), we know that an error vector distributed according to E W (U N ) is friendly for (π, T ) with high probability (specifically at least 1 − β − exp(−Ω ε (N/ log N )), where the β term accounts for the chance that W causes more than pN errors).
If E W (Enc(m; T, ·)) were statistically close to E W (U N ), we could conclude that errors distributed according to E W (Enc(m; T, ·)) are also friendly for (π, T ) and we would be done. However, these error distributions are only online space-S indistinguishable. So in order to apply this style of reasoning, we would need to argue that checking whether an input error vector e ∈ {0, 1} N is friendly for (π, T ) can be done by an online space-S machine (that can depend non-uniformly on π).
This task amounts to checking that π(e |T ) decodes to the all zeroes message. Since the decoder for REC corrects a fraction κ of worst-case errors for the outer code REC out , this condition is met if at most a κ fraction of inner blocks (each with b data bits, corresponding to a codeword of REC in ) are decoded to a non-zero element of {0, 1} a . This check could potentially be made in low space if we had access to e permuted according to π. Unfortunately, we are only guaranteed indistinguishability against tests with online access to e. We do not know of a method for checking friendliness of e for (π, T ) in online space-S.
We therefore resort to a more complicated and indirect argument. We follow ideas from our earlier work [35] on the correction of t-wise independent errors. Specifically, we will show that any particular set of S/b data blocks of the concatenated code behave as they would for binary symmetric errors. We can then use concentration bounds for t-wise independent random variables with t = (S/b data ) to argue that decoding succeeds with high probability.
Lemma 7.12. For every subset P of at most S/b data positions of REC out , the probability (taken over π and the choice of e according to E W (m; T, ·)) that the inner decodings for REC in on π(e |T )
return a non-zero element of {0, 1} a for every position in P is at most (κ/5) |P | + (N + 1)2 −S .
Proof. Since |P |b data S = o(N/ log N ), by the Ω(N/ log N )-wise independence of the permutation π, for each fixed error vector e, and therefore also for e chosen according to E W (U N ), the probability that all positions in P are decoded incorrectly is at most (κ/10) |P | + 2 −|P |b data (κ/5) |P | . The condition that all inner blocks of REC in corresponding to positions in P are incorrectly decoded can be checked by an online branching program of width 2 S , by simply keeping the at most (S/b data ) · b data = S bits in the blocks corresponding to P in memory. Since E W (m; T, ·) and E W (U N ) are online space-S indistinguishable with advantage (N + 1)2 −2S , we get the conclusion of the lemma.
To complete the argument and prove that at most a κ fraction of positions of REC out are decoded incorrectly, we need the following probabilistic fact. We include a proof, which is based on ideas used to prove similar statements in [33] , for completeness. Claim 7.1. Let α ∈ (0, 1/3) and X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be 0-1 valued random variables with Pr[X i = 1] α for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Further assume that for every subset P ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} of size ,
for some α 0. Then
Proof. Define Z = n i=1 X i and S = 1 i 1 <i 2 <···<i n X i 1 X i 2 · · · X i to be the 'th symmetric function. Since the X i are 0-1 valued, when Z = a, S = a . We have
3αn using Markov's inequality. By linearity of expectation and the hypothesis (2), we have E[S ] n α . Since 3αn n, n / 3αn n− 3αn− and the claim follows.
Let us now combine Lemma 7.12 and Claim 7.1 applied with the choice = S/b data , α = κ/5 + (N + 1)2 −2S , α = (κ/5) + (N + 1)2 −2S , and n = n data which is the number of data blocks of the payload codeword (which is also the block length of REC out ).
As n data = Ω(N ) and S o(N/ log N ), we have
for large enough N . Also α = (κ/5) + (N + 1)2 −2S 2N (κ/5) since ε 2 S and κ ε O(1) . Since 3α = 3κ/4 + o N (1) κ, the tail bound (3) implies that the the probability (taken over π and the choice of e according to E W (m; T, ·)) that more than a fraction κ of the inner blocks corresponding to REC in are incorrectly decoded is at most
This finishes the proof of Lemma 7.11, which in turn implies Lemma 7.5 and completes the proof of our main Theorem 7.3 on space-bounded channels.
Time-Bounded Channels
The ideas behind our code construction for online space-bounded channels are quite general and can be extended to construct codes against more powerful channels provided we have the necessary explicit pseudorandom generators that can play the role of Nisan's generator for branching programs. In this section, we focus on channels which can be described by polynomial sized circuits. Specifically, we say a channel has circuit size T on inputs of length N if the effect of the channel can be described by a randomized circuit of at most T gates.
Construction. Suppose we desire a code of block length N and rate 1 − H(p) − ε that can be list-decoded errors caused by a channel of circuit size N c that flips at most pN bits with high probability. We can use a similar construction scheme to the online space-bounded case, with the size of the control blocks b ctrl = c log N for a suitable c (chosen large enough compared to c), and with the components LSC and the generator Nis changed (as described below) to accommodate the more powerful channel. The inner code LSC used for the control information encoding will be replaced by a (δ, L)-listdecodable whose codewords are indistinguishable from U b ctrl with advantage N −c by (randomized) circuits of size N c+Ω (1) . A Monte Carlo construction similar to the one described in Proposition 7.2 can construct such a code with probability 1 − N −Ω(1) in poly(N ) time.
The generator Nis will be replaced by an efficiently computable pseudorandom generator PolyPRG : {0, 1} ζ(ε)N → {0, 1} N of constant stretch such that the output of PolyPRG fools all circuits C of size N c+Ω(1) ; formally
Such a pseudorandom generator which is computable in poly(N ) time exists under computational assumptions. For instance, the existence of one-way functions suffices [40, 19] , as does the worst-case complexity assumption that E ⊆ SIZE(2 ε 0 n ) for some absolute constant ε 0 > 0 [21] where E = DTIME(2 O(n) ) and SIZE(2 ε 0 n ) denotes the class of languages that have size O(2 ε 0 n ) circuits.
Decoding algorithm and its analysis. The decoding algorithm is identical to the algorithm described in Section 7.5 for the case of online space-bounded channels.
Turning to the analysis, the part about recovering the control information applies verbatim, and implies that the list decoding of the control information succeeds in finding the correct control information with high probability. An analog of the Hiding Lemma 7.9 (and its Corollary 7.10) where indistinguishability is with respect to size N c+Ω(1) circuits follows with an identical argument. The analog of Lemma 7.11, which was at the heart of the proof that the payload decoding also succeeds w.h.p., is in fact easier to prove for polynomial-sized circuits and implies that the error vector caused by the size N c channel is friendly for π with high probability. (The proof is easier since a circuit of some fixed polynomial size can perform the check that an error vector e is friendly for π; recall that this was the difficulty in the online space-bounded case and we required a more complex argument). We can thus prove the following formal statement for coding against channels of polynomial size.
Theorem 8.1. Assume either E ⊆ SIZE(2 ε 0 n ) for some ε 0 > 0 or the existence of one-way functions. For all constants ε > 0, p ∈ (0, 1/2), and c > 1, and for infinitely many integers N , there exists a Monte Carlo construction (succeeding with probability 1 − N −Ω(1) ) of a stochastic encoder/decoder pair (Enc, Dec) with the following properties:
• Enc encodes a message of length RN (1 − H(p) − ε)N bits into N bits.
• (Enc, Dec) runs in time N O(c) .
• For every received word r ∈ {0, 1} N , the decoder Dec(r) outputs a list of at most poly(1/ε) candidate messages.
• For all messages m ∈ {0, 1} RN , and for all randomized channels W with circuit size N c (which could depend non-uniformly on m) that cause at most pN errors with probability 1 − N −Ω(1) , the list output by the decoder contains m with probability at least 1 − N −Ω(1) (taken over the stochastic encoding and the channel noise).
A Ingredients for Code Construction for Additive Errors
In this section, we will describe the various ingredients that we will need in our construction of capacity achieving AVC codes, expanding on the brief mention of these from Section 6.1.
A.1 Constant rate codes for average error
By plugging in an appropriate explicit construction of list-decodable codes (with sub-optimal rate) into Theorem 4.2, we can also get the following explicit constructions of stochastic codes, albeit not at capacity. We will make use of these codes to encode blocks of logarithmic length control information in our final capacity-achieving explicit construction. The total number of bits in all these control blocks together will only be a small fraction of the total message length. So the stochastic codes encoding these blocks can have any constant rate, and this allows us to use any off-the-shelf explicit constant rate list-decodable code in Theorem 4.2 (in particular, we do not need a brute-force search for small list-decodable codes of logarithmic block length). We get the following claim by choosing d = 1 and picking C to be a binary linear (α, c 1 (α)/2)-list decodable code in Theorem 4.2.
Proposition A.1. For every α, 0 < α < 1/2, there exists c 0 = c 0 (α) > 0 and c 1 = c 1 (α) < ∞ such that for all large enough integers b, there is an explicit stochastic code SC k,α of rate 1/c 0 with encoding E : {0, 1} b × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} c 0 b that is efficiently strongly α-decodable with probability
Moreover, for every message and every error pattern of more than a fraction α of errors, the decoder for SC k,α returns ⊥ and reports a decoding failure with probability 1 − c 1 2 −b .
Further, there exists an absolute constant c 3 = c 3 (α) such that on input a uniformly random string y from {0, 1} c 0 b , the decoder for SC k,α returns ⊥ with probability at least 1 − c 1 2 −b (over the choice of y).
Proof. The claim follows by choosing d = 1 and picking C to be a binary linear (α, c 1 (α)/2)-list decodable code in Theorem 4.2. The claim about decoding a uniformly random input follows since the number of strings y which differ from some valid output of the encoder E is at most a fraction α of positions is at most 2 2b 2 H(α)c 0 b . By standard entropy arguments, we have (1 − H(α))c 0 b + log(c 1 (α)/2) 3b (since the code encodes 3b bits, the capacity is 1−H(α), and at most log(c 1 (α)/2) additional bits of side information are necessary to disambiguate the true message from the list). We conclude that the probability that a random string gets accepted by the decoder is at most
A.2 Reed-Solomon codes
If F is a finite field with at least n elements, and S = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) is a sequence of n distinct elements from F, the Reed-Solomon encoding, RS F,S,n,k (m), or just RS(m) when the other parameters are implied, of a message m = (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m k−1 ) ∈ F k is given by
where
The following is a classic result on unique decoding Reed-Solomon codes [32] , stated as a noisy polynomial reconstruction algorithm.
Proposition A.2 (Unique decoding of RS codes).
There is an efficient algorithm with running time polynomial in n and log |F| that given n distinct pairs (α i , a i ) ∈ F 2 , 1 i n, and an integer k < n, finds the unique polynomial f of degree at most k, if any, that satisfies f (α i ) = a i for more than n+k 2 values of i. Note that this condition can also be expressed as {i :
We also state a list-decoding generalization (the version due to Sudan [37] suffices for our purposes), which will be used in our result for space-bounded channels.
Proposition A.3 (List decoding of RS codes [37] ). There is an efficient algorithm with running time polynomial in n and log |F| that given n distinct pairs (α i , a i ) ∈ F 2 , 1 i n, and integer k < n, finds the set L of all polynomials f of degree at most k, if any, that satisfy f (α i ) = a i for at least t values of i as long as t > √ 2kn. Moreover, there are at most 2n/k polynomials in the set L.
A.3 Pseudorandom constructs
A.3.1 Samplers
, 1} has density µ (i.e., µN elements), then standard tail bounds imply that for a random subset T ⊆ [N ] of size , the density of B ∩ T is within ±θ of µ with overwhelming probability (at least 1 − exp(−c θ )). But picking a random subset of size requires ≈ log(N/ ) random bits. The following shows that a similar effect can be achieved by a sampling procedure that uses fewer random bits. The idea is the well known one of using random walks of length in a low-degree expander on N vertices. This could lead to repeated samples while we would like distinct samples. This can be achieved by picking slightly more than samples and discarding the repeated ones. The result below appears in this form as Lemma 8.2 in [38] .
Proposition A.4. For every N ∈ N, 0 < θ < µ < 1, γ > 0, and integer 0 = Ω( For every B ⊆ [N ] of size at least µN , with probability at least 1 − γ over the choice of a random s ∈ {0, 1} σ , |Samp(s) ∩ B| (µ − θ)|Samp(s)|.
We will use the above samplers to pick the random positions in which the blocks holding encoded control information are interspersed with the data blocks. The sampling guarantee will ensure that a reasonable fraction of the control blocks have no more than a fraction p + ε of errors when the total fraction of errors is at most p.
A.3.2 Almost t-wise independent permutations
Definition 14. A distribution D on S n (the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}) is said to almost twise independent if for every 1 i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i t n, the distribution of (π(i 1 ), π(i 2 ), . . . , π(i t )) for π chosen according to D has statistical distance at most 2 −t for the uniform distribution on t-tuples of t distinct elements from {1, 2, . . . , n}. P A uniformly random permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n} takes log n! = Θ(n log n) bits to describe. The following result shows that almost t-wise independent permutations can have much shorter descriptions.
Proposition A. 5 ([22] ). For all integers 1 t n, there exists D = O(t log n) and an explicit map KNR : {0, 1} σ → S n , computable in time polynomial in n, such that the distribution KNR(s) for random s ∈ {0, 1} σ is almost t-wise independent.
A.3.3 t-wise independent bit strings
We will also need small sample spaces of binary strings in {0, 1} n which look uniform for any t positions.
Definition 15.
A distribution D on {0, 1} n is said to t-wise independent if for every 1 i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i t n, the distribution of (x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x it ) for x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) chosen according to D equals the uniform distribution on {0, 1} t . P Using evaluations of degree t polynomials over a field of characteristic 2, the following well known fact can be shown. We remark that the optimal seed length is about t 2 log n and was achieved in [2] , but we can work with the weaker O(t log n) seed length. Proposition A.6. Let n be a positive integer, and let t n. There exists σ O(t log n) and an explicit map POLY t : {0, 1} σ → {0, 1} n , computable in time polynomial in n, such that the distribution POLY t (s) for random s ∈ {0, 1} σ is t-wise independent.
A.4 Capacity achieving codes for t-wise independent errors Forney [12] constructed binary linear concatenated codes that achieve the capacity of the binary symmetric channel BSC p . Smith [35] showed that these codes also correct patterns of at most a fraction p of errors w.h.p. when the error locations are distributed in a t-wise independent manner for large enough t. The precise result is the following. Proposition A.7. For every p, 0 < p < 1/2 and every ε > 0, there is an explicit family of binary linear codes of rate R 1 − H(p) − ε such that a code REC : {0, 1} Rn → {0, 1} n of block length n in the family provides the following guarantee. There is a polynomial time decoding algorithm Dec such that for every message m ∈ {0, 1} Rn , every error vector e ∈ {0, 1} n of Hamming weight at most pn, and every almost t-wise independent distribution D of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have Dec(REC(m) + π(e)) = m with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω(ε 2 t) over the choice of a permutation π ∈ R D, as long as ω(log n) < t < εn/10. (Here π(e) denotes the permuted vector: π(e) i = e π(i) .)
We will use the above codes (which we denote REC, for "random-error code") to encode the actual data in our stochastic code construction.
B Capacity-achieving codes for average error
The average error criterion is an extensively studied topic in the literature on arbitrarily varying channels; see the survey [26] and the many references therein. Here we assume the message is unknown to the channel and the decoding error probability is taken over a uniformly random choice of the message and the noise of the channel. The following defines this notion for the special case of the additive errors. The idea is that we want every error vector to be bad for only a small fraction of messages.
Definition 16 (Codes for average error).
A code C with encoding function E : M → Σ n is said to be (efficiently) p-decodable with average error δ if there is a (polynomial time computable) decoding function D : Σ n → M ∪ {⊥} such that for every error vector e ∈ Σ n , the following holds for at least a fraction (1 − δ) of messages m ∈ M: D(E(m) + e) = m. P
B.1 Codes for average error from stochastic codes for additive errors
A slightly more general notion of stochastic codes (Definition 3) implies codes for average error.
Definition 17 (Strongly decodable stochastic codes). We say a stochastic code is strongly pdecodable with probability 1 − δ if the decoding function correctly computes both the message m and randomness ω used at the encoder, with probability at least 1 − δ. P Using a strongly decodable stochastic code we can get a code for average error by simply using the last few bits of the message as the randomness of the stochastic encoder. If the number of random bits used by the stochastic code is small compared to the message length, the rates of the codes in the two models are almost the same. Observation B.1. A stochastic code SSC that is strongly p-decodable with probability 1 − δ gives a code AVC of the same block length that is p-decodable with average error δ. If the ratio of number of random bits to message bits in SSC is λ, the rate of AVC is (1 + λ) times the rate of SSC.
B.2 Explicit capacity-achieving codes for average error
We would now like to apply Observation B.1 to the stochastic codes constructed in Section 6 and also construct explicit codes achieving capacity for the average error criterion. For this, we need to ensure that the decoder for the stochastic code can also recover all the random bits used at the encoding. We already showed (Lemma 6.5) that the random string ω comprising the control information is in fact correctly recovered w.h.p. However, there is no hope to recover all the random strings r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r used by the various SC encodings. This is because some of these control blocks could incur much more than a fraction p + ε of errors (or in fact be totally corrupted).
Our idea is to use the same random string r for each of the encodings SC(A i , r) in Step 5. Since each run of SC-Decode is correct with probability at least 1 − c 1 /N 2 , by a union bound over all n blocks, we can claim that all the following events occur with probability at least 1 − c 1 /N (over the choice of r):
Among the control blocks, all of the at least ε /2 control blocks with at most a fraction p + ε of errors are decoded correctly, along with the random string r, by SC-Decode. Further, SC-Decode outputs ⊥ on all the other control blocks. Thus the correct random string r gets at least ε /2 "votes."
By Lemma 6.4, with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(ε 2 N/ log 2 N ))) (over the choice of ω), the number of payload blocks that get accepted as control blocks is at most ε /24. (Note that this lemma only used the t -wise independence of the offset string ∆.)
The above facts imply that the control information ω is recovered correctly with probability at least 1 − O(1/N ) over the choice of (ω, r) (this is the analog of Lemma 6.5). Also r is the unique string which will get at least ε /2 votes from the various runs of SC-Decode. Therefore it can be correctly identified (with probability at least 1 − O(1/N ) over the choice of (ω, r)) after running SC-Decode on all the n blocks. We can thus conclude the following result on capacity-achieving codes for average error (Definition 16).
Lemma B.2 (Polynomially small average error). For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, there is an explicit family of binary codes of rate at least 1 − H(p) − ε that are efficiently p-decodable with average error O(1/N ) where N is the block length of the code.
One can reduce the error probability in this theorem by using redundant, but t-wise independent, values r i for the control block encodings. Specifically, let (r 1 , ..., r ) be a random codeword from a Reed-Solomon code of dimension ε /8 (the simpler construction above corresponds to a majority code). Then the r i values are, in particular, ε /8-wise independent. One can modify the proof of Lemma 6.3 (which states that sufficiently many control blocks are recovered) to rely on only this limited independence. Under the same conditions that the control information is correctly recovered, there is enough information to recover the entire vector r 1 , ..., r . We can thus prove the following: Theorem B.3 (Exponentially small average error). For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), and every ε > 0, there is an explicit family of binary codes of rate at least 1 − H(p) − ε that are efficiently p-decodable with average error exp(−Ω ε (N/ log 2 N )) where N is the block length of the code.
C Impossibility Results for Bit-Fixing Channels when p > 1 4 We show that even very simple channels prevent reliable communication if they can introduce a fraction errors strictly greater than 1/4. In particular, this result (a) separates the additive (i.e., oblivious) error model from bounded-space channels when p > 1/4, and (b) shows that some relaxation of correctness is necessary to handle space-and time-bounded channels when p > 1/4.
Theorem C.1 (Impossibility for p > 1 4 , detailed version). For every pair of randomized encoding/decoding algorithms Enc, Dec that make n uses of the channel and use a message space whose size tends to infinity with n, if a uniformly random message is sent over the channel, then 1. there is a distribution over memoryless channels that alters at most n/4 bits in expectation and causes a decoding error with probability at least 2. for every 0 < ν < 1 4 , there is an online space-log(n) channel W 2 that alters at most n( 1 4 + ν) bits (with probability 1) and causes a decoding error with probability Ω(ν).
Our proof adapts the impossibility results of Ahlswede [1] on arbitrarily-varying channels. We present a self-contained proof for completeness. Readers familiar with the AVCs literature will recognize the idea of symmetrizability from [1] .
The Swapping Channel. We begin by considering a simple swapping channel, whose behavior is specified by a state vector s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) ∈ {0, 1} n . On input a transmitted word c = (c 1 , ..., c n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , the channel W s outputs c i in all positions where c i = s i , and a random bit in all positions where c i = s i . The bits selected randomly by the channel at different positions are independent.
There are several equivalent characterizations that help to understand the channel's behavior. First, we may view the channel as outputting either c i or s i , independently for each position. This view of the channel makes it obvious that the output distribution is symmetric with respect to the inversion of c and s. That is, W s (c) and W c (s)are identically distributed
The key idea behind our lower bounds is that if s is itself a valid codeword, then the decoder cannot tell whether c was sent with state s, or s was sent with state c. If c and s code different messages, then the decoder will make a mistake with probability at least 1/2.
Note that the expected number of errors introduced by the channel is half of the Hamming distance dist (c, s) ; specifically, the number of errors is distributed as Binomial(dist(c, s), 1 2 ). As long as dist(c, s) is close to n/2, then the number of errors will be less than n( Because of the symmetry of the swapping channel, the right hand side is equal to the probability that the decoder outputs m , rather than m. This is a decoding error as long as m differs from m. We assumed that the size of the message space grows with n, so the probability that m = m goes to 0 with n. We use "right" and "wrong" and shorthand for the events that decoding is correct and incorrect, respectively. Thus, the probability of correct decoding is at most It remains to show that the expected number of bit corruptions is at most n/4. This follows directly from the following fact, which is essentially the Plotkin bound from coding theory: Claim C.1 (Plotkin). If (m, r) is independent of and identically distributed to (m , r ), then the expectation of the distance dist(Enc(m, r), Enc(m , r )) is at most n/2.
Proof. By linearity of expectation, the expected Hamming distance is the sum, over positions i, of the probability that Enc(m, r) and Enc(m , r ) disagree in the ith positions. The probability that two i.i.d. bits disagree is at most Part (b) of the lemma follows since the expected number of errors introduced by the swapping channel is half of the Hamming distance between the transmitted word and the state vector.
Bounding the Number of Errors. To prove part (2) of Theorem C.1, we will find a (nonuniform) channel with a hard bound on the number of bits it alters. In logarithmic space, it is easy for the channel to count the number of bits it has flipped so far and stop altering bits when a threshold has been exceeded. The difficult part is to show that such a channel will still cause a significant probability of decryption error.
As before, the channel will select m , r at random and run the swapping channel W s with state s = Enc(m , r ). In addition, however, it will stop altering bits once the threshold of n( 1 4 + ν) bits have been exceeded.
Consider now the transmission of a random codeword c = Enc(m, r). Let G be the event that dist(c, s) n( 1 2 + ν). By a Markov bound, the probability of G is at most 1/2 1/2+ν , and so the probability of G is 1 − Pr(Ḡ) 2ν 1+2ν ν. Conditioned on G, the number of bits altered by W s on input c is dominated by Binomial(n( 1 2 + ν), 1 2 ). The probability that the number of bits altered exceeds n( 1 4 + ν) is therefore at most exp(−Ω(ν 2 n)). On the other hand, conditioned on G there is a significant probability of a decoding error. To see why this is the case, first note that conditioned on G the error-bounded channel will simulate W s (c) nearly perfectly. Moreover, the event G is symmetric in c and s, and so conditioning on G does not help to distinguish W c (s) from W s (c). By the same reasoning as in the previous proof, Pr(incorrect decoding|G) 1 2 − o(1) .
Since G has probability at least ν, the channel causes a decoding error with probability at least ν 2 − o(1), in expectation over the choice of s. Hence, there exists a specific string s * for which the channel causes a decoding error with probability 
